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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J I M J E N S E N , et al.,
Plaintiffs-B espondents,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants, I rase M 0
BLANCHE PARSONS, et al,
'
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

13682

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
J I M J E N S E N , et al.
STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE
OF T H E CASE
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment
entered by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge
of the Third Judicial District Court, declaring Section
1
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15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1966, as amended, to be null and void and
beyond the power of the Salt Lake County Board of
Commissioners to enact.

DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
The captioned cases were consolidated for trial
before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of
the Third Judicial District Court. The cases came on
regularly for hearing before Judge Hanson on March
18, 1974. After hearing, Judge Hanson issued a Memorandum Decision declaring Section 15-18-4 (5) of the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as
amended, to be null and void and beyond the power of
the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners to enact.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the lower court's
judgment that Section 15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended, is null
and void and beyond the power of the Salt Lake County
Board of Commissioners to enact.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 23, 1973, the Salt Lake County Board of
Commissioners approved and enacted into law an
amendment to Section 15-18-4 of the Revised Ordi-
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nances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended. Said
amendment provided an additional subsection (5) to
such ordinance, which required the filing by license
applicants with the Salt Lake County License Director:
(5) A certificate showing that:
a) the applicant has practiced as a massage
therapist for a period of at least five (5) years
prior to the date of this amendment to the Massage Parlor Regulations; or
b) That the applicant is a graduate of a
massage and therapy school approved by the
American Massage and Therapy Association; or
c) is a fully accredited member, in good
standing, of the American Massage and Therapy Association.
Subsequent to the enactment of the above ordinance
by the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, the
respondents, massage parlor owners and employees of
massage parlors respectively, brought the captioned actions seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance
was null and void and beyond the power of the Salt
Lake County Board of Commissioners to enact.
The above cases were consolidated for hearing and
came on regularly for such hearing before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court, on March 18,1974. Upon hearing, Judge
Hanson issued a Memorandum Decision declaring Section 15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1966, as amended, to be null and void and
3
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beyond the power of the Salt Lake County Board of
Commissioners to enact. From that decision and judgment, defendants-appellants bring this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R IN
R U L I N G T H E C O U N T Y O R D I N A N C E IS
P R E E M P T E D B Y S E C T I O N 58-1-1.1 O F
U T A H CODE A N N O T A T E D (1953).
Appellants contend in the Point I portion of their
brief that the trial court erred in ruling that Section
15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1966, as amended, is preempted by Section
58-1-1.1, Utah Code Annotated (1953). Appellants'
contention clearly will not withstand careful scrutiny.
Section 58-1-1.1, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
provides:
The right to engage in any lawful profession, trade or occupation is an inherent right and
such right shall not be impaired through state
regulation unless the interests of the people of
the state generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require such regulation and
state regulation is the most effective and equitable means of providing the necessary protection
to the people of the state. I t is further declared
that the relative degree of hazard to the public
health, safety or welfare which may result from
an unregulated profession, trade or occupation
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shall be supported by adequate experience and
research. Such research shall include, among
other things:
1. That the practitioner performs a service
for individuals which may directly result in a
detrimental effect upon the public health, safety
or welfare.
2. The view of the appropriate department
concerning the proposed legislation and the recommendations and criticisms submitted by the
department.
3. The view of a substantial portion of the
people who do not practice these particular professions, trades or occupations.
4. The number of states which have similar
regulatory professions [provisions] as those proposed.
5. The view of those who shall be subject
to the proposed regulation.
6. That there is sufficient demand for the
service for which there is no substitute not likewise regulated and this service is required by a
substantial portion of the population.
7. That the profession, trade or occupation
requires high standards of public responsibility,
character and performance of each individual
engaged in such profession, trade or occupation
and is so indicated by established and published
codes of ethics.
8. That the profession, trade or occupation
requires such skill that the public generally is not
qualified to select competent practitioners without some visible assurance that he has met minimum qualifications.
5
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9. That professional, trade or occupational
associations do not adequately protect the public
from incompetent, unscrupulous or irresponsible
members of the profession, trade or occupation.
10. That the services of the profession,
trade or occupation must be assured the public
as a paramount consideration, regardless of cost.
11. That those laws which pertain to public
health, safety and welfare generally are ineffective or inadequate. The characteristics of the
profession, trade or occupation make it impractical or impossible to prohibit those practices of
the profession, trade or occupation which are
detrimental to the public health, safety or welfare.
Even the most cursory reading of the above-cited
statute discloses that such statute provides for a state
policy of noninterference in and nonregulation of professions, trades, and occupations unless a clear showing
is made that the interests of the people require such
regulation. In the event that the interests of the people
are shown to require such regulation, the statute enunciates the further standards that (a) such regulation
should be provided by the state if state regulation is
shown to be the most effective and equitable means of
providing the necessary protection to the people of the
state, and (b) such regulation should be provided for
only subsequent to a research study gauging the degree
of hazard to the public health, safety, or welfare that
will result if such regulation is not provided for.
It should be noted that the state statute on its face
effectively preempts the area of regulation of profes-
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sions, trades, and occupations by its declaration that the
right to engage in a profession, trade, or occupation is
an "inherent right" and by its clear proviso that "state
regulation is the most effective and equitable means of
providing the necessary protection to the people of the
state" should regulation be found necessary. Thus, the
county commission, by merely enacting Section 15-18-4
(5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County,
1966, as amended, has improperly intruded into an area
of regulation foreclosed from county regulation by the
state statute. [See Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 55
Cal.2d 74, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974 (1960).]
Secondly, it is manifest in the instant case that the
state has already provided for indirect regulation of the
practice of administering massage. In point of fact, two
sections of Utah's Physical Therapy Practice Act
contain provisions relating to the practice of administering massage.
Section 58-24-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides :
(1) One year from the effective date of
this act, no person shall practice or hold himself
out as being able to practice physical therapy for
compensation received or expected, in this state,
unless he is licensed in accordance with the provisions of this act; provided, however, that nothing in this act shall prohibit:
(a) Any person licensed under the laws
of this state from engaging in the practice for
which he is licensed.

7
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(b) A person not licensed under this act
from administering massage, external baths,
or normal exercise,, provided stich person does
not in amy way represent himself to be a physical therapist.
(c) Any person employed by an agency,
bureau or division of the government of the
United States from performing the duties for
which he is employed while he is performing
the duties of such employment. (Emphasis
added.)
Section 58-24-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides :
(1) The department and the committee
shall issue a license as a physical therapist to each
person who meets the following qualifications:
(a) Is a resident of the state of Utah at
the time of the passage of this act.
(b) Complies with the provisions of section 58-24-6 (1), (2) and (3).
(c) Makes application within six months
after the effective date of this act.
(d) Was practicing physical therapy:
(1) In the state of Utah at the time
of passage of this act, or
(2) For at least three years during the
past seven years, including at least one year
of practice in this state.
(e) Pays a licensing fee of $5.
(2) The department and the committee
may, in their discretion, issue a license as a phy8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sical therapist to a person who meets the following qualifications:
(a) Qualifies under section
Utah Code Annotated 1953.

58-1-19,

(b) Is a resident of the state of Utah.
(c) Complies with the provisions of section 58-24-6 (1), (2), (3) and (6).
For the purposes of this section, a person
merely administering massages, external baths
or normal exercise shall not be deemed to be a
physical therapist or entitled to licensure under
this section. (Emphasis added.)
The above statutes clearly indicate that the Legislature has reviewed the practice of administering massage in connection with the enactment of the Physical
Therapy Practice Act and has concluded that the
practice of massage is not a profession, trade, or occupation so affecting the public interest as to require
state regulation. Since the State Legislature has apparently made that determination, the county ordinance
constitutes an unwarranted and improper intrusion by
the county into an area of regulation preempted by the
State Legislature.
Finally, even if we assume, arguendo, that the
county could properly regulate the practice of administering massage, it would still be necessary for the
county, in enacting such a regulatory ordinance, to conform to the procedural requirements established by Sectioh 58-1-1.1, Utah Code Annotated (1953) relating
to necessary "research" gauging the degree of hazard
9
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to the public safety, health, or welfare that will result
if such regulation is not provided for. In the instant
case, no such "research" was conducted precedent to the
enactment of the ordinance and therefore the ordinance
for that reason does not conform to the requirements of
Section 58-1-1.1.
From the above it should be abundantly clear that
Section 15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake County is preempted by Section 58-1-1.1, Utah
Code Annotated (1953). For that reason, this court
should affirm the decision of the trial court that the
county ordinance is null and void and beyond the power
of the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners to
enact.
POINT II
T H E T R I A L COURT DID NOT E R R IN
R U L I N G T H E COUNTY ORDINANCE IS
P R E E M P T E D B Y T H E C R I M I N A L CODE
W I T H ITS ENUMERATED PROHIBITIONS
A N D P E N A L T I E S W I T H R E G A R D TO S E X
ACTS.
Appellants contend in the Point I I portion of their
brief that the trial court erred in ruling that Section
15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1966, as amended, is preempted by the Utah
Criminal Code with its enumerated prohibitions and
penalties with regard to sex acts. This argument also
will not bear careful examination.
10
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I t is well established as a matter of law that a county
or municipal ordinance is invalid if it attempts to impose
additional prohibitions or requirements in an area already occupied by the state, or is in conflict with or duplicates state law in an area where the state has already
legislated. Lancaster v. Municipal Court for the Beverly Hills Judicial District of Los Angeles County, 100
Cal. Rptr. 609, 494 P.2d 681 (1972); Corey v. City of
Dallas, 352 F . Supp. 977 (1972).
In Lancaster v. Municipal Court for the Beverly
Hills Judicial District of Los Angeles County, supra,
the California Supreme Court held that a county ordinance which prohibited the massage of a person by a
member of the opposite sex constituted a regulation of
sexual conduct and was therefore invalid because the
state had preempted the regulation of criminal aspects
of sexual activity to the exclusion of local regulation.
The court found that although it was argued that the
ordinance should be viewed as a regulation of the
massage parlor business and not as a regulation of
sexual conduct, the underlying purpose of the ordinance
was to make the task of the police department easier in
their fight against prostitution and lewd conduct, and
therefore the ordinance was a regulation of sexual
conduct and must be held invalid because the state
had preempted the regulation of the criminal aspects of
sexual activity. In its decision, the court said:
There has been no suggestion of any reasonable purpose to the ordinance before us other
than to limit sexual activity. Although it has been
U
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urged that the ordinance should be viewed as a
regulation of the business of administering massages and not a sexual regulation, the only specification of any actual or potential evil is the
sexual activity which may follow in the wake of
the massage.
#

#

#

At oral argument the district attorney admitted that the ordinance was a sexual regulation
when he stated, "The purpose of the prohibition
. . . is to regulate a source of licentiousness . . .
this ordinance regulates nude exposure." This
admission clearly indicates that the purpose of
the ordinance in question was not to regulate the
operation of massage parlors but was aimed at
making the task of the police department and
sheriff's office easier in their fight against prostitution and lewd conduct. W e are satisfied that
the ordinance is a regulation of the criminal aspects of sexual conduct. . . .
W e conclude that the Los Angeles ordinance which is a regulation of sexual conduct
must be held invalid because the state has preempted the criminal aspects of sexual activity.
(494 P.2d at 683-684.)
Similarly, in Corey v. City of Dallas, supra, the
United States District Court for the Northern Division
of Texas, in overturning a city ordinance prohibiting
massage upon persons of the opposite sex, held that the
ordinance was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment since there were alternative methods which the
city could employ to achieve the ordinance's explicit
purpose of prohibiting illegal sexual conduct.
12
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In its decision the court found that the underlying
purpose of the ordinance was to prohibit illegal sexual
conduct, and since the ordinance affected the fundamental right to work, the interest of the City of Dallas
in enforcing the ordinance must be based on a compelling governmental interest. The court concluded that
such compelling governmental interest was lacking in
the case because there were alternative methods which
the city could employ to achieve the objectives of the
ordinance without affecting the rights of persons to carry
on a legitimate business since there were other city
ordinances and state statutes which prohibited lewd and
immoral conduct. In its decision, the court said:
The evidence in this case shows that the
underlying purposes of Section 25A-15 are the
prohibition of illegal sexual conduct between
persons of the opposite sex under the guise of
administering massages and the formulation of
agreements between males and females to commit such acts at other places.
The court feels such an interest is lacking
in this case because there are alternative methods
which the City of Dallas may employ to achieve
the objective of the ordinance. . . . There are . . .
other city ordinances and state statutes which
prohibit lewd and immoral conduct. Since alternative remedies are available to the City of Dallas, the objectives of Section 25A-15 are not
superior to the fundamental rights of those who
may be adversely affected by the enforcement of
that provision of the ordinance. (352 F . Supp. at
981-982.)
13
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Applying the above-cited cases and authority to the
facts in the instant case, it is clear that Section 15-18-4
(5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County,
1966, as amended, is invalid in that it attempts to impose
additional prohibitions or requirements in an area already occupied by the state.
Evidence adduced at trial in this matter established
clearly and beyond dispute that the underlying purpose
of subsection (5) of Section 15-18-4 of the Revised Ordinances is not to regulate the operation of massage parlors or to set standards for massagists, but to assist Salt
Lake County Sheriff's officers in combating illegal
sexual activities allegedly associated with local massage parlors. [See in this regard the testimony of Commissioner Pete Kutulas, Tr. 111-112, and the testimony
of Nicholas G. Morgan, 111, Tr. 117-119.]
Since the underlying purpose of subsection (5) of
Section 15-18-4 of the Revised Ordinances is not to
regulate the operation of massage parlors or to set
standards for massagists, but to assist Salt Lake County
Sheriff's officers in combating and regulating illicit
sexual activity, subsection (5) directly supplements and
conflicts with existing state (Utah Code Annotated Sections 76-10-1301 thru -06 (1953) and county (Section
16-23-4) criminal legislation under the guise of regulating massagists. For that reason, subsection (5) constitutes an unwarranted and improper intrusion by the
county into an area of regulation preempted by the State
Legislature. Thus, the trial court properly struck down
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the ordinance as null and void and beyond the power of
the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners to enact.
POINT III
T H E T R I A L COURT DID NOT E R R I N
R U L I N G T H E COUNTY ORDINANCE ARBITRARY, UNCERTAIN, AND VAGUE.
Appellants contend in the Point I I I portion of
their brief that the trial court erred in ruling that Section
15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County, 1966, as amended, was arbitrary, uncertain, and
vague. This argument also is misconceived and will not
withstand close analysis.
Section 15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordiances of
Salt Lake County is clearly an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of police power because it arbitrarily discriminates between persons who can qualify under the
ordinance and persons who, regardless of their qualifications, do not meet the prescribed standards and consequently cannot qualify. It requires that an applicant for
a license either have five years' prior experience as a
massage therapist or be a graduate of an approved
school of massage therapy or be an accredited member
of the American Massage and Therapy Association. I t
contains no provision for alternative procedures for
qualification for individuals who have an established
practice as a massagist, but fail to have the required
five years' experience or education or membership to be
able to demonstrate their qualifications. Nor does it
15
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provide for an apprentice-type program for individuals
presently employed within the profession so they can
acquire the necessary experience. Consequently, the
effect of subsection (5) is to prohibit those individuals
from practicing their chosen occupation, not because
they are incompetent or unethical or engage in immoral
activities, but because they not do have the good fortune
to meet the standards that are arbitrarily established and
required.
Other courts have held similar legislative attempts
to regulate individuals practicing in the healing arts to
be unconstitutionally arbitrary and unreasonable so as
to constitute a denial of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Whittle v. State Board of
Examiners of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328 (1971);
Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101 (1963); J.S.K. Enterprises v.
City of Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (1971) ;
Snedeker v. Venmar, Ltd., 151 So.2d 439 (1963).
In Whittle v. State Board of Examiners of Psychologists, supra, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held
unreasonable a state statute similar to the county ordinance challenged in the instant case. The statute required that a psychologist, if he did not have a doctor's
degree, have five years' experience under approved
supervision in order to be licensed, but made no provision for an alternate way for him to establish or demonstrate his qualifications or competence. In its decision,
striking down the statute, the court said:

16
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Since Plaintiffs-in-Error had established a
successful practice as psychologists in Oklahoma
at a time when it was lawful to do so in this State
without licensing, that practice must be viewed as
a vested property right, subject only to such subsequent regulation as might be reasonably and
rationally related to safeguarding the public
health and welfare . . . . W e feel that under the
circumstances, the Board should have established
some reasonable alternative procedure for allowing the applicant to demonstrate his competence.
We hold that since the applicant was not statutorily entitled to take the examination to demonstrate his competence, the administrative rule
herein resulting in the denial of a license without
a suitable alternative procedure to demonstrate
such competence was unreasonable. (483 P.2d at
329-330.)
Similarly, in Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, the California Supreme Court held that
a licensing statute for an optician was invalid in that it
prescribed that the necessary five years' experience
could be obtained in only two ways, neither of which
was arguably superior to many other ways of obtaining
experience.
In its decision, the court concluded that the necessary expertise could be obtained in ways other than that
outlined in the statute, and that there was an absence of
any relationship between the requirements imposed and
the object of the legislation. In its decision, the court
held:
There is a complete absence of any relationship between the experience requirements sought
17
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to be imposed and the legislative effort to correct
ethical abuses in the profession. The Legislature
has taken direct action against these abuses and
may take such further action as it deems necessary, but it cannot reasonably be concluded that
the legislation in question bears any relation to
these problems. (368 P.2d at 104.)
In J.S.K. Enterprises v. City of Lacey, supra, the
Washington Supreme Court struck down a city massage
parlor ordinance prohibiting massages upon persons by
members of the opposite sex. The court held that the
ordinance constituted an unreasonable exercise of police
power in that (a) it went beyond the objective of
protecting the public from lewd acts in massage parlors,
(b) was unduly oppressive to massagists and their
patients, and (c) constituted discrimination on the basis
of sex.
In its decision, the court recognized that the massage business was a potential setting for lewd and immoral acts. Further, it acknowledged that a city, in the
exercise of its police power, could regulate massagists
on the grounds of public health, safety, or welfare. But
the court stressed that, as in any other exercise of the
police power, the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary and appropriate to accomplish the objective
sought, and must not be unduly oppressive upon individuals. Applying these criteria, the court found that the
ordinance was an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise
of police power because it went beyond the means
necessary and appropriate to accomplish its objective
18
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and was unduly oppressive to massagists and their
patients.
Finally, in Snedeker v. Venmar, Ltd., supra, a
suit for declaratory judgment was brought to determine
the constitutionality of a statute regulating masseurs
which required (a) that such persons be graduates of an
accredited massage school, or (b) that such persons submit proof of like experience or education. The question
raised was whether or not the provision was reasonably
related to public interests which may be protected by the
exercise of police power. In its decision, the Florida
court held that there was no reasonable relationship
between the statutory requirement and public safety
or welfare because the course of technical training required (600 hours' schooling or like experience) would
not make the masseurs any more competent in their
particular occupation or enable them to perform those
functions better, and was therefore not an interest in
behalf of which the police power could be properly
exercised.
Applying the rationale of the above-cited cases to
the facts in the instant case, there is no indication that
the requirements imposed by subsection (5) bear any
rational relationship to the experience or training necessary to become a competent massagist. The ordinance
simply overlooks the fact that there are other ways to
become a qualified massagist. It attempts to place massagists in the category of physical therapists, and it is
unreasonable to impose or correlate the educational
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requirements and experience required to be a physical
therapist with the experience and training to become a
massagist. Because the experience or educational requirements are disproportionate to actual training and
experience necessary to become a competent massagist,
and because there is no provision for massagists who do
not meet those requirements to demonstrate their competence, the ordinance is an arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of police power.
Secondly, even though admittedly there are undeniable abuses within the massage profession, both the
state (Utah Code Annotated Sections 76-10-1301 thru
-06 (1953) and the county (Section 16-23-4) have
legistlation directed against any such abuses, and
can therefore take direct action against such abuses.
The requirements imposed by subsection (5) bear no
reasonable relationship to either abuses within the profession or regulation of massagists. Since the requirements imposed by subsection (5) have no reasonable
relationship to abuses within the profession or regulation of massagists, and since the ordinance effectively
acts as an outright prohibition of the right of individuals
to work in their chosen occupation, the ordinance is an
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the power to
regulate.

CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in ruling that Section
15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
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County, 1966, as amended, is preempted by Section
58-1-1.1 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953). Moreover, the trial court did not err in ruling that said county
ordinance is preempted by the Utah Criminal Code's
enumerated prohibitions and penalties with regard to
sex acts. Finally, the trial court did not err in ruling that
such ordinance was uncertain, arbitrary, and vague on
its face. This court should affirm the trial court's ruling
that Section 15-18-4 (5) of the Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended, is null, void, and
beyond the power of the Salt Lake County Board of
Commissioners to enact.
Respectfully submitted,
P H I L L. H A N S E N
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
•v

Attorney for PlaintiffsRespondents Jim Jensen, et al.
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